Dangerous Champions of IT Innovation by Gogan, Janis et al.
1 
 
Dangerous Champions of IT Innovation 
 
 
Janis L. Gogan 
Bentley University, USA 
jgogan@bentley.edu 
 
 
Kieran Conboy 
NUI Galway, Ireland 
kieran.conboy@nui galway.ie 
 
 
Joseph W. Weiss 
Bentley University, USA 
jweiss@bentley.edu 
 
Abstract 
 
An IT innovation champion is a self-appointed 
advocate of a hardware, software or data innovation. 
A dangerous IT innovation champion can expose an 
IT innovation project, as well as one or more 
operational processes and the organization, to 
reputational, financial, and other risks. While most 
prior studies see champions as heroes who drive 
projects forward through advocacy and marshaling 
of resources, some prior studies reported that 
champions do not always succeed and some reported 
that ineffective or dysfunctional champions may 
cause harm. We answer calls for more research on 
dysfunctional or ineffective innovation champions, by 
reflecting on particularly dangerous high-level IT 
innovation champions revealed in three field-based 
case studies. Based on our study findings, we discuss 
how to spot dangerous champions in time to mitigate 
high project and business risks. 
 
1. Introduction  
  
Organizations vary in their readiness to utilize 
bleeding-edge emerging IT applications. Top 
management support is often seen as a panacea that 
helps ensure IT project success. However, some 
executives are high on enthusiasm but low on 
awareness of technical, organizational, inter-
organizational and other risks. This paper considers 
problems that these high-level IT innovation 
champions (CEOs and CIOs) can cause, by 
promoting risky new IT applications or by allocating 
resources and attention to them, while giving 
insufficient focus to processes, procedures and 
controls that are needed to ensure that new or 
ongoing systems perform reliably.  
After defining the concept of a dangerous 
champion, we present and discuss five examples 
from prior case research: a dangerous CEO-champion 
described in one classic teaching case [19] and a 
dangerous CIO-champion described in a classic 
teaching case [17]. Then we describe three dangerous 
IT innovations champions (two CIOs, one CIO) 
observed in our recent field-based studies.  
 
1.1 Dangerous IT Innovation Champions 
 
Dangerous IT innovation champions can be 
difficult to spot, since at first their behavior seems 
similar to effective IT champions who promote 
promising but risky new technologies [22]. Effective 
IT innovation champions promote new development 
methods, new software application, or use of new IT 
devices [1]. They are persuasive – often persistently 
so! They keep advocating for a particular IT 
platform, device, application or method, until 
resources are provided to implement it.  
As is pointed out in a recent literature review [20] 
and in Section 2 (below), much prior champion 
research – including a stream of management studies 
that addressed champions of new product innovation 
and a stream of IS studies of IT innovation which 
focused on effective champions. Some prior studies 
cautioned that a champion could be ineffective or 
possibly over-zealous.  Our research shows that while 
all champions articulate a persuasive vision about the 
focal innovation, some champions do not succeed in 
realizing value from it. An over-zealous champion 
can cause harm by diverting resources away from 
worthier projects, or by boldly entering innovation 
territory for which they lack appropriate knowledge 
and suitable oversight capabilities.  These champions 
are dangerous because they do not know what they 
do not know, and thus expose the innovation project, 
neglected processes or projects, and the organization 
to unacceptably high risk, without initiating 
compensatory risk mitigation. They lack some 
knowledge and capabilities necessary to achieve the 
vision. If a champion does not recognize this 
knowledge deficit, they can make risky decisions or 
fail to mitigate important risks.  
While most champions focus on a compelling 
long-range vision, some dangerous IT innovation 
champions focus so intently on that vision that they 
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fail to attend to evidence close at hand, such as 
system-related problems that threaten day-to-day 
operations. Therefore, in several ways dangerous IT 
innovation champions threaten projects, operational 
processes, and even their organizations.  
In Section 1 we describe dangerous IT innovation 
champions observed in two classic teaching cases. 
After reviewing the literatures of new-product 
champions and IT innovation champions in Section 
2, we then describe three dangerous IT innovation 
champions encountered in our recent field-based case 
studies. We discuss our findings in light of a 
framework that juxtaposes a champion’s focus on 
innovation versus operational reliability, against the 
champion’s relevant knowledge and expertise.  
Two widely-taught field-researched teaching 
cases -- Fixing the Payment System at Alvalade [19] 
and CareGroup [17] -- describe managers we classify 
as dangerous IT innovation champions. Each 
champion – a CEO and a CIO -- was highly 
persuasive about IT innovation, yet each exposed 
their organization to danger. These champions did 
not recognize that they lacked key capabilities and 
knowledge to ensure project success and operational 
and system reliability; we discuss them next. 
 
1.2 An IT Innovation Fails on a Very Hot Day 
 
The Alvalade case, set in Portugal in 2003, 
introduces a former professional soccer player who 
was the charismatic CEO of a catering company that 
won the contract to manage all food/beverage 
services in Lisbon’s new state-of-the-art Alvalade 
Stadium [19]. Before first opening its doors, this 
champion announced that an innovative payment 
system (under development) would serve as the only 
way fans could purchase food and beverages at 
restaurants, bars, and cafeterias, and from 
“ambulantes” walking around the stadium. Payment 
cards would feature pictures and profiles of famous 
soccer players (combining a payment mechanism 
with a collectible memento). With great fanfare, 
before the stadium’s inaugural soccer match 
(Sporting Club of Portugal versus Manchester 
United) a publicity campaign touted the payment 
system. Meanwhile, work on the stadium fell behind 
schedule (something the catering CEO had no 
influence over). Construction delays meant that full 
end-to-end testing of the new payment system was 
not conducted. The systems integrator was only able 
to conduct an incomplete test of the new system just 
days before the opening match, with no time to test 
the changes they made as a result of the test.  
A mix of bad luck and technical and managerial 
missteps caused the system to fail spectacularly 
during the inaugural match, on an unseasonably hot 
day. Nearly everything that could go wrong, did. A 
rooftop antenna (controlling the wireless network 
necessary for ambulantes to accept card payments) 
overheated and failed. In the cafeteria, long lines 
formed. Angry fans nearly rioted, because the system 
slowed to a crawl. Cash registers did not include 
bottled water as an authorized product (with 
potentially fatal consequences for overheated fans) 
and there was no contingency plan specifying what to 
do about predictable problems like this which could 
have been anticipated. Luckily, the Portuguese team 
won the match and no riot or stampede occurred.  
The catering company CEO should have 
shouldered some blame for the fiasco, since the case 
reveals that he exhibited five dangerous behaviors 
before the match: 1) He set unrealistic expectations 
by promoting the untested payment system. 2) The 
CEO failed to hire a lawyer experienced in software 
projects to review vendor proposals and the final 
contract; 3) He selected a local vendor that had only 
recently shifted from selling office equipment, to 
packaged software in its product line and (quite 
recently), to system integrator (this vendor had never 
delivered a project of this scope, and they installed 
the wrong version of SQL Server for the payment 
system). 4) The CEO approved a design that would 
relied entirely on the new payment card (no cash or 
credit card payments); 5) He did not direct his staff to 
develop contingency plans that could have  spelled 
out clear triggers and workarounds for various system 
failure scenarios.  
 
1.3 A Visionary’s Near Vision is Out of Focus 
 
The CareGroup case describes a Boston-based 
multi-hospital organization. Its CIO, John Halamka, 
MD, was (and still is) a persuasive advocate for new 
healthcare IT. Dr. Halamka is multi-talented: he 
started a software company while a college student 
majoring in computer science and economics, and 
subsequently simultaneously studied engineering and 
medicine. As CIO he oversaw an enterprise software 
project that represented a big step forward for 
CareGroup, which had grown by acquiring several 
other hospitals. He also oversaw an electronic health 
record project, an emergency department smart-board 
system, and other IT innovation projects. With great 
fanfare, he inserted an RFID chip in his arm to 
highlight its potential role in supporting a fully 
portable patient record. Currently, he writes and 
frequently speaks about blockchain applications for 
patient care and healthcare supply chains. This 
tireless IT innovation champion paints a compelling 
picture of a future where needed information will be 
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seamlessly available across all patient encounters, 
and in which all clinical and administrative processes 
will be optimally efficient and effective.  
While Dr. Halamka has impressive software 
expertise and a remarkable ability to envision how 
radical technologies can transform health care, in 
2002 (the time of the case), his knowledge of how to 
ensure a reliable operational backbone was 
incomplete, and he was not cognizant of IS 
governance and control best practices. This IT 
innovation champion was dangerous because his 
oversight of the people, tools, and capabilities for 
ensuring system reliability was weak. While he 
closely monitored new-technology projects, he did 
not put appropriate mechanisms and staffing in place 
to ensure 24/7 system reliability.  
In 2002, CareGroup experienced a crisis when its 
primary network crashed. Providers, accustomed to 
24/7 access to online medical records, lab results, and 
other applications, were forced to revert to ill-defined 
paper-based processes for nearly a week. The CIO 
heroically put in long hours, inspiring his medical 
and IT staff to also do so. Thankfully, no patients 
suffered serious harm during the network crisis. Still, 
this unfortunate episode was costly and revealed 
weak governance and oversight. Called before the 
Board of Directors to explain what happened and 
how he would ensure it would not happen again, Dr. 
Halamka presented the following lessons learned 
(paraphrased for brevity): 
 
1. Keep network equipment up to date. 
2. Never rely on a single source of expertise. 
3. Keep IT knowledge up to date.  
4. Control end-user experimentation. 
5. Establish network change controls. 
6. Recognize that mergers bring IT risks. 
7. Don’t say yes to every user request. 
8. Keep contingency plans current. 
9. Provide redundant access to critically-
important information and data. 
10. Life-cycle manage network components. 
An applicant for the CIO job should know these 
ten lessons, which are basic knowledge requirements 
for the job. A CIO should anticipate adverse 
scenarios and prepare contingency plans that let 
employees know what to do when  a network (or 
software or database) fails. The Board needed to 
consider whether to replace Dr. Halamka, hire a co-
CIO who would focus on system reliability and 
security, or otherwise restructure the IT organization 
so that someone would be accountable for ensuring 
system reliability and another person held 
accountable for innovation.  
Our analysis of the Alvalade and CareGroup 
cases (contributed by other field researchers) reveals 
that dangerous IT innovation champions can expose 
projects, processes, and their organizations to risk. 
Yet, while many empirical studies focused on 
effective champions, only a few studied ineffective 
champions (those who promoted innovations that 
failed or resulted in negative consequences). Few 
papers explain how or why dangerous champions 
expose their organizations to unacceptably high risks. 
 
2. Innovation Champions: Prior Research  
 
In this section we discuss two research streams:  
management studies of champions of new products 
based on innovative technologies (not necessarily IT) 
and IS studies of IT innovation champions. 
 
2.1 New-Product Champion Studies 
 
Champions in Donald Schon’s classic 1963 study 
were well-trained engineers who successfully 
promoted radical technological innovation for new 
products. Schon stated that each champion “actively 
and vigorously [promotes his idea, despite initial] 
sharp resistance … Many display persistence and 
courage of heroic quality … a few become martyrs to 
the championed idea.” [21], (p. 84). Following 
Schon, many subsequent studies focused on 
successful innovation champions. For example, a 
1980 paper offered evidence that the champion role 
evolves in step with an organization’s evolution (e.g., 
from small startup to single-product line integrated 
enterprise, to diversified firm) and that champions 
can emerge from many levels of the hierarchy, from 
middle-managers on a technical or non-technical 
career ladder, to the executive level [15]. However, a 
1986 paper concluded that champions are “neither as 
widespread, unambiguous, nor as unabashedly 
desirable as the popular literature on innovation 
would have us believe.” That paper called for 
research addressing such questions as: “What are the 
effects of championing an unsuccessful product? … 
[and] Can there be too much championing?” [7].  
A 2001 study reported that champions were 
equally likely to advocate for innovations that 
ultimately succeed as for innovations that fail; that 
paper called for studies examining “methods for 
holding champions accountable for their actions” 
[16]. A 2005 paper warned: “Senior managers may 
be swept away by champions’ passion and conviction 
and potentially ignore danger signs that the project is 
failing.” [11] (p. 660). Another paper warned that 
innovation champions in the R&D group are “on the 
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horns of a tricky dilemma. They must not only 
determine how to best initiate and champion risky 
projects destined for high failure rates, but also put in 
place mechanisms for terminating them in a timely 
manner” [13] (p. 1455). Executive champions 
sometimes support highly risky projects that fail or 
do not live up to expectations [8], [12].  
Thus, some early champion studies in the 
management literature extended Schon’s exploration 
of effective champions, and other papers called for 
studies examining ineffective or over-zealous 
champions. A complete review of these studies is 
beyond the scope and page constraints of this paper.  
However, a 2015 paper [13] contends that some high-
level innovation champions engage in dangerous 
escalation of commitment to a failing project [3]: 
“Dysfunctional executive advocacy increases the 
chances that ‘weak’ project decisions are made at the 
initiation phase [and will] negatively influence 
[project] termination decisions … [after failing to 
use] best-practice project management and [project] 
termination decision processes and practices.”  
 
2.2 IT Innovation Champion Studies 
 
In parallel with the management stream on 
innovation champions, IS scholars also conducted 
champion studies, as far back as a 1983 study of 
decision support systems (DSS) champions [5]. A 
1990 study that compared 25 champions of 
successful IT innovation projects with 25 peer non-
champions (similarly-knowledgeable employees who 
worked on the same projects but whose peers did not 
see them as champions) reported that champions 
exhibited more “transformational leader” behaviors 
and used more varied influence tactics. These IT 
innovation champions linked advocacy of the 
innovation to “larger principles or unassailable 
values,” and they provided “emotional meaning and 
energy to the idea,” which helped build commitment 
to it [10]. Yet, that paper cautioned that attempts to 
formalize the champion role could backfire, by 
undermining the champion’s “intrinsic motivation 
and commitment [which could] jeopardize the 
innovation’s ultimate success” [10]. In 1991, Beath 
[1] observed that IT champion behavior is an 
emergent process that cannot be effectively 
mandated. She reported that successful mid-level or 
executive IT champions appreciated three forms of 
organizational support: relevant information (helps 
them evaluate an IT innovation and persuade others 
of its merits), assistance from high-quality IT staff 
with needed expertise, and political support. About 
half of the champions in that study worked with the 
CIO to further their aims, while other champions 
worked independently of the CIO. Beath saw the 
“zealous champion” as potentially problematic: “IT 
champions usually want IS managers to … postpone 
other projects in favor of theirs. … The problem IS 
managers confront is how to manage the constant 
realignment of goal sets perturbed by a zealous 
champion” [1] (p. 367). Thus, within the IS 
community Beath raised the question of potentially 
dysfunctional champions who could cause harm to 
their organization’s IT architecture. 
In 2004, Swanson and Ramiller [22] contended 
that some leaders (and/or their organizations) are not 
sufficiently mindful when it comes to IT innovation; 
they saw mindfulness [23], [24], [6] as an antidote to 
harmful champion faddishness: “Mindfulness … may 
entail wariness …, and where needed it may foster a 
resistance to jumping on innovation bandwagons … 
Innovating mindfully may actually mean that a firm 
forestalls or foreswears a new initiative, as facts and 
conditions relevant to the local organizational context 
dictate” [22] (p. 559). In this view of IT innovation, a 
mindful organization “attends to an innovation with 
reasoning grounded in its own organizational facts 
and specifics. [This supports] sound judgements 
about whether adopting a particular innovation is a 
good thing to do, [and] when … and how 
implementation and assimilation can be best pursued. 
… Context matters in rendering such judgments” [22] 
(p. 554). The mindful organization is wary of failure 
and its leaders see near-miss incidents (like the 
CareGroup network outage – a near-miss because no 
patient suffered severe harm) as signals of possible 
failure to come. In contrast, a “mindless” 
organization is susceptible to fads: “When a 
bandwagon develops around an IT innovation, the 
mindless firm may join it … impressed by success 
stories that appear to validate the innovation as a 
good, maybe even irresistible idea.” [22] (p. 554). 
Swanson and Ramiller warned against conflating 
innovativeness and mindfulness: “The manager who 
indiscriminately puts into play all kinds of new IT … 
[does] little to foster organizational mindfulness” 
[22] (p. 559). They called for studies to closely 
examine mindful/mindless champion behavior. 
Leaders walk a fine line between being mindful 
and cautionary, versus being innovation enthusiasts. 
A 2007 study reported that charismatic/inspirational 
champion leadership (optimism, enthusiasm, vision, 
confidence) and idealized influence (pride, purpose, 
altruism, respect, morality, collectivity) contribute to 
IT innovation project success [18]. A 2008 study of 
high-level IT innovation champions contended that 
top management support “is not simply one of many 
CSFs (critical success factors) needed for project 
success; [it] is the most important CSF,” and that 
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“project managers cannot hold primary responsibility 
for the realization of benefits because they tend to 
leave a project after [its completion]… and before the 
benefits are realized” [25] (p. 722). These IS studies 
further affirm that a CEO or CIO can be an effective 
IT innovation champion.   
A review of 22 IT champion studies introduced 
the term “dangerous champion” and called for 
research on this topic (which answers earlier calls for 
studies that challenge the idea that a champion is by 
definition effective): “Many studies investigated 
champions’ competencies and identities, relationships 
and influence tactics, and roles and activities … yet it 
is a rarely-disputed claim that champions have a 
positive impact. We contend that dangerous 
champions exhibit both effective and ineffective 
champion behavior. Yet, few studies investigated 
“champions’ negative impacts [or] … champions … 
driving IS innovations in the wrong direction” [20]. 
To address this and other calls for further study of 
ineffective, dysfunctional or dangerous champions, 
we start with the premise (per [20]) that dangerous 
champions exhibit behaviors similar to effective 
champions: they articulate a persuasive case for the 
risky new technology and persuade influential 
decision makers to move forward with one or more 
projects. Our study addresses two research questions: 
 RQ1: What behavior and capabilities distinguish 
dangerous IT innovation champions, compared 
with effective IT innovation champions? 
 RQ2: Can dangerous IT innovation champion 
behavior be spotted in time to mitigate 
innovation risks? 
 
3. Research Method  
 
In Section 1 we discussed dangerous IT 
innovation champions we identified in classic field-
researched teaching cases developed by other 
scholars. Here, we provide an overview of three 
studies we conducted between 2017 and 2019. Each 
study was designed to investigate a broader set of 
questions related to IT innovation, and that included 
interviews with high-level IT innovation champions:  
 Case Study 1 (Blockchain and a Dangerous 
CEO): Several small interconnected healthcare-
related organizations (two non-profits and two 
for-profit organizations) collaborate to design 
blockchain solutions to two interrelated 
challenges: Dangerous medication waste and 
underserved needy patients. 
 Case Study 2 (AI and a Dangerous CEO): A 
medium-sized physician group collaborates with 
a software vendor to design a new system that 
will, for the first time, apply two forms of 
artificial intelligence to a set of mission-critical 
tasks. 
 Mixed-Methods Study 3 (A Dangerously Agile 
CIO): At a large financial services company, a 
CIO-champion attempts to manage a complex 
portfolio of IT projects by adopting various agile 
development innovations. 
 
In all of the case studies, the champion and one or 
more subordinates and other stakeholders were 
interviewed. Company archival documents as well as 
public accounts of company activities were included 
in the case study database.  
From data thus gathered in these three studies, we 
identified three dangerous high-level IT innovation 
champions: two CEOs and one CIO. Similar to 
effective champions described in prior studies, these 
executives advocated persuasively for their chosen 
innovations, and obtained or allocated supportive 
resources. Yet, they exposed their organizations to 
high risks, by failing to recognize needed knowledge 
and capabilities or failing to attend to signals that 
pointed to vulnerabilities that jeopardized system and 
operational reliability. We describe these cases next. 
 
4. Recent Cases 
 
4.1 Blockchain and a Dangerous CEO   
     
     A pharmacist in a poor community serves patients 
who struggle to afford their medications – especially 
expensive cancer or HIV drugs. When some patients 
died before taking all of their expensive unexpired 
medications, their grieving relatives approached him, 
hoping to donate the drugs to other patients. 
However, in this U.S. state (and many others) it was 
not legal for pharmacies to accept donations of 
unused, unexpired drugs (some states allowed 
redistribution of drugs donated by institutions, such 
as hospitals or nursing homes, but not individuals).     
The pharmacist became an ardent champion for 
political and social change, and later, IT innovation. 
     He first set up a charity pharmacy to dispense 
institutionally-donated drugs to needy customers -- at 
no charge to his neediest customers and at low prices 
to others. His team implemented a batch system for 
refilling drugs used for treating chronic conditions: 
once these drugs were dispensed in once-per-quarter 
batches, operational costs dropped. By 2019 the 
pharmacy was nearly able to sustain itself without 
grant support. The social entrepreneur next lobbied 
for passage of a new law in his state; now individuals 
are permitted to donate unused medications to 
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authorized charitable pharmacies, so this charity 
pharmacy can receive expensive unused drugs from 
individuals and dispense them to needy patients.  
Hoping to scale up, the pharmacist/CEO attended 
healthcare-related conferences to learn about best 
practices in medication redistribution. Afterreading 
about the use of blockchain in supply chains, he 
became convinced that a blockchain could maintain 
an irrefutable chain of custody so recycled drugs 
would not fall into illegitimate hands. He next 
assembled a team to design and test a solution to 
safely, securely and efficiently receive expensive 
drugs from institutional and individual donors, and 
deliver them to patients. Since then, he founded 
several organizations, each tackling an aspect of the 
medication waste problem. 
This champion now speaks at conferences about 
his vision of blockchain as an enabling innovation for 
tackling the medication waste problem while helping 
needy patients. He has had no formal IT training, yet 
espouses a “fail-forward” incremental development 
philosophy [2] (create and test a rough prototype, get 
customer feedback on it, modify it in response to the 
feedback, and so on until a design emerges that 
shows strong customer acceptance). Meanwhile, he 
does not fully appreciate the financial and project 
risks his several organizations face. None of the four 
organizations he founded is self-sustainable; all are in 
danger of backsliding if he does not closely monitor 
operational details. Each organization is small but 
growing, which creates risky instability. Each venture 
needs financial backing to bridge to a state where 
revenues reliably exceed costs.  
Regarding IT project risks: according to Gartner, 
blockchain applications in healthcare in general, and 
particularly in logistics/transportation and supply 
chains, have not reached the Peak of Inflated 
Expectations. These applications are “embryonic” – 
at least ten years from widespread acceptance and use 
[9]. Gartner does predict the blockchain solutions 
market will grow to $3 trillion, but not before 2030 
[4].  So, any blockchain project aiming to solve the 
medication waste problem is risky. In a small 
organization, such risk can be dangerous.  
This CEO might not yet fully appreciate the 
implications of an immutable blockchain. The “fail-
forward” approach does work well in some 
component-based software development contexts. 
However, a blockchain prototype does not evolve 
into a strong application. Changes to a blockchain 
produce a cumbersome, opaque, and unmanageable 
design. Instead of failing forward by retaining some 
workable code and building on it, each blockchain 
prototype must be discarded; the development team 
starts fresh with the next version (and the next and 
the next) until they can commit to a design they 
expect will not change. This is analogous to creating 
several minimally viable products (MVPs) out of 
inexpensive materials; each physical prototype is 
evaluated and discarded until the designers are ready 
to commit to a buildable version.  
Thus, the medication redistribution blockchain 
project is risky, and (unfortunately) this CEO-
champion does not fully recognize many of the risks.  
 
4.2 AI and a Dangerous CEO  
 
The CEO of a US-based physician group led his 
organization since its founding with ten physicians 
more than 20 years ago. Today it provides 
administrative services to more than 500 providers. 
In 2017 the CEO sought a solution to the company’s 
medical coding compliance problem. Medical coding 
is complex, knowledge-intensive, and critically-
important for claims billing.  
When a physician (or other healthcare provider) 
sees a patient, they document the encounter by 
dictating notes for professional transcription by a 
third party, or by entering notes into template-based 
software that integrates with an electronic medical 
record. Newer approaches to documentation are 
gaining ground, including speech recognition 
software that captures a doctor’s comments for 
automatic transcription (in 2019, speech recognition 
software is used extensively by professional 
transcriptionists, and to a much lower extent by 
physicians). Medical coding needs to correctly align 
with this documentation. Codes provide a structured 
description of the encounter, the patient’s condition 
and/or diagnosis, and procedures the provider used to 
treat them. Various medical codes (including so-
called evaluation-and-management CPT codes1, 
which were the focus of the innovation described in 
this case) must align with the provider’s 
documentation in the patient’s medical record; 
otherwise, a third-party payer (whether private or 
public insurer) might refuse a claim (or subsequently 
demand some of their money back). In 2015, ICD-10, 
an internationally-supported diagnostic code set, 
replaced a far smaller ICD set. This greatly increased 
the complexity of aligning ICD codes with 
documentation and with CPT codes. It created 
challenges for providers seeking to be paid correctly 
and to avoid costly penalties or reputational harm. In 
this knowledge-intensive domain of medical coding, 
experts predict artificial intelligence (AI) will 
someday shoulder much of the code-selection burden. 
However, much work needs to be undertaken before 
                                                 
1 “CPT” sounds for Current Procedure Terminology. 
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AI solutions are available for all forms of coding in 
all medical specialties.  
Since this physician group has grown to its 
current size of 500 providers, and since it operates at 
a profit, we assume its CEO is a generally competent 
manager and leader. He has not received formal IT 
training, but he is quite enthusiastic about IT 
innovations. When an acquaintance mentioned their 
company’s work on an AI solution for one form of 
coding, the CEO was eager to adopt it. If his friend’s 
software solution worked, it would dramatically 
reduce the firm’s cost of verifying that providers 
entered appropriate billing codes, which would 
reduce the likelihood of recoupment demands or 
penalties (such as those imposed by Medicare). He 
hoped that eventually his friend’s company could 
offer software that would fully automate the medical 
coding process; this would free up providers’ time to 
help them provide attentive patient care.  
This champion is dangerous. He overlooks the 
risk in the fact that this will be the first-ever 
application of natural language interpretation and 
machine learning in the evaluation-and-management 
CPT medical coding domain. In signing the contract, 
he saw tremendous long-term upside potential but 
failed to recognize a high financial risk: the physician 
group was required to pay the software vendor for 
each examined claim, even though the group would 
give the vendor a massive amount of their claims data 
(a very large data set is essential to effective machine 
learning in this domain). He did not recognize the 
contract transferred great financial risk to his firm, 
while minimizing the vendor’s costs (the vendor 
would receive the claims data free of charge).  
Several project risks were also high. No one in the 
physician group IS organization had AI expertise, 
adding to the already-high technical risk (it would be 
difficult for them to evaluate the vendor’s work). 
Even the vendor’s technical expertise risk was at 
least moderately high (since this is to be a first-of-its 
kind solution). Some organizational risks also 
threatened the project. The group had never before 
collaborated on a project like this (they had 
successfully implemented some packaged software, 
but this project would present far greater technical 
complexity). Our case study learned that the software 
vendor did not display strong cross-organizational 
expertise (although it apparently did have a good 
track record of managing its own projects).  
Before the scheduled project launch, a newly-
hired middle manager met with the CEO to explain 
why the planned project would be very risky. 
Worried the meeting might not go well, this 
whistleblower updated their resume. Fortunately, the 
CEO responded constructively to this intervention. 
Acting on their advice, the CEO insisted that the 
contract needed to be re-negotiated to protect the 
group’s interests. The vendor agreed not to charge the 
group for its claims reviews, and the CEO agreed to 
freely provide the large quantity of claims data the 
vendor needed for the machine learning. At the 
whistleblower’s suggestion, the CEO also approved 
several parallel coding quality projects that would 
focus on organizational issues (such as by working 
closely with those providers poor coding quality 
records). These projects ensured that if the machine 
learning project took a long time to generate value, 
the company should nevertheless improve its claims 
coding quality and (hopefully) avoid costly penalties.  
This is a near-miss situation; this dangerous IT 
innovation champion would have put both the project 
and his organization at great risk. Post-intervention, 
the collaboration has moved forward on dramatically 
different terms: a new contract states that until the AI 
software consistently demonstrates 95% accuracy, 
the physician group owes no money to the vendor. 
The newcomer, who now oversees the project, has 
put in place several mechanisms to mitigate other 
project risks (in recognition of the group’s technical 
expertise shortcomings, potential communication 
problems, and other risks). The whistleblower also is 
in the process of developing contingency plans to 
handle problems should they nevertheless arise 
during the machine learning project. 
 
4.3 A Dangerously Agile CIO  
 
In 2012 the new CIO of a large multi-national 
systems development organization embarked on a 
“digital transformation” of its technology division, 
which employed more than 20,000 staff in eight U.S. 
cities and in Australia, China, India, Ireland, and the 
U.K. The CIO aimed to improve productivity and 
increase and enable all aspects of workforce diversity 
– from improving gender balance across the 
organization, to enabling remote working, flexible 
hours and implementing a ‘bring your own device’ 
that would free staff from fixed technologies and 
strict technology supplier contracts.  
The first sign that this CIO was a dangerous 
champion was revealed in an evaluation exercise to 
choose which large-scale agile method would be 
used. The evaluation pointed to many significant 
downsides of the Scaled Agile Framework (SaFe) – 
one of the most concerning being the view that SaFe 
is not suited to a heavily regulated industry with strict 
compliance requirements. The evaluation also 
revealed that the existing method (put in place before 
the CIO’s appointment) was “a clear winner both in 
terms of track record and suitability.” Nevertheless, 
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the CIO chose SaFe. He was certain it would improve 
productivity, and he felt “a fresh start was needed” 
and that staff needed a “new label to grab on to.”  
The SaFe choice was problematic, since more 
than 65% of the firm’s clients were heavily-regulated 
medical organizations, subject to various compliance 
requirements. In the first six months since SaFe 
adoption, most metrics deteriorated, including 
defects, time-to-delivery, sprint rhythm, and staff 
retention. After 12 months, a senior executive 
reported that some metrics showed improvement and 
no metric had deteriorated further. She reported 
“growing confidence” among some (not all) key 
staff. However, by then 14% of the company’s clients 
had left, due to compliance concerns.  
In June 2013, confronting a problematic year-end 
report, the CIO decided to introduce a new agile 
development variant that was used effectively by 
Spotify. All staff were re-trained for new roles, and 
new seating arrangements were put in place. Again, 
performance metrics declined. Some developers, 
feeling “burned” by the SaFe initiative, did not 
change their practices. Some overtly refused to 
change, and others covertly did “what we always do 
… while calling it whatever the CIO wants to hear”. 
Many employees stated that cynicism, frustration and 
tension built in 2013 and 2014. One developer called 
it “the single biggest culture change in the 22 years 
I’ve been here.”  
In 2015 the CIO, believing that no publicly-
available agile method would fit his company’s 
needs, moved to a newly developed in-house method. 
Yet, the same issues that plagued the other methods 
continued to exist. One cynical study participant 
stated the CIO “believes everything can be changed 
by a label. If this method doesn’t work, get a new 
one. If that doesn’t work, change again. [The CIO 
thinks] it is the people that are wrong and that a new 
method will fix them.”  
Next, the CIO declared that AI, which could 
identify better patterns and rhythms of work, would 
fix the issues the development effort had experienced 
in the past six years. All staff underwent AI training, 
and by 2019 they were required to demonstrate their 
use of AI and machine learning in their work. Yet, 
recently the CIO stated that available AI tools were 
falling short of what his team needed. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Prior research contributed to an understanding of 
effective IT innovation champions: they spot a high-
potential emerging artifact; articulate a persuasive 
case/vision of the value this can bring; embody the 
necessary leadership characteristics to inspire others; 
and draw on IT-specific capabilities to derive value 
form the innovation. We observed that many prior 
empirical studies focused on effective champions and 
did not provide substantial evidence about ineffective 
or dangerous champions (several papers did call for 
further study of ineffective or dangerous champions). 
Our contribution was to identify dangerous IT 
innovation champions in field-based case studies and 
juxtapose their key behaviors and characteristics with 
those of ideally-effective IT innovation champion. 
Like all champions, dangerous champions state a 
persuasive vision; however dangerous champions put 
their organizations at unacceptably high risk. 
Sometimes (not always) the risk is realized – the 
champion fails to derive value from the promising IT 
innovation they promoted, or their actions cause 
financial or reputational harm. They are dangerous 
because of gaps in their knowledge and capabilities, 
and/or because of their attentional focus. Because 
they lack knowledge of IT risks and controls, they 
fail to identify and mitigate relevant project risks or 
operational risks. Because they focus on a compelling 
future vision driven by investments in innovative 
technologies, they fail to notice operational issues 
close at hand. Thus, our field research indicates that 
effective and dangerous IT champions can be 
usefully described along these two dimensions of 
attention and knowledge/capabilities (Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1, IT Innovation Champions 
   
Similar to the catering company CEO in the 
Alvalade case (described in Section 1), the two CEOs 
presented in Section 3 are technology enthusiasts 
who lack high-level technology-management skills. 
Like the CEO from the class case, these two CEO 
champions successfully persuaded others to share 
their vision – so much so that they created 
dangerously unrealistic expectations about the 
likelihood that the innovation will be implemented 
successfully. Because their vision was oriented to 
future benefits, and because they were unaware of 
their knowledge and capability gaps, they failed to 
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attend to risks that could delay or derail the project. 
Our two dangerous IT innovation champions might 
not recognize the harm that can befall their 
organization’s finances and reputation, if the 
implemented innovation does not work correctly.   
In case 4.1 the enthusiastic pharmacist/social 
entrepreneur/CEO is moving forward with many 
projects at a rapid pace, with little or no consideration 
of mounting business and project risks. His aim is 
laudatory, yet his ability to execute on his vision is 
questionable. He does not have a demonstrable track 
record of building entrepreneurial ventures (moving 
from vulnerable startup to long-term sustainability). 
Although he has articulated a persuasive vision for 
the use of blockchain to support a medication reuse 
operation, he has not installed processes and controls 
in place to ensure that patients will be protected from 
harm; and he has also not ensured that his several IT 
innovation ventures can survive if their projects are 
delayed or their systems are flawed.  
In Case 4.2 a middle manager’s timely (and 
brave) intervention focuses the CEO’s attention on 
business and project risks, and convinces him to 
renegotiate the contract with the vendor and allocate 
some resources to other projects that can help ensure 
their coding compliance issues are dealt with in the 
event that the innovative use of natural language 
interpretation software and machine learning 
encounters some obstacles. We hope they will now 
successfully collaborate with the software vendor. It 
is too early to predict whether this risky AI project 
will succeed, but the newcomer’s intervention 
reduced the physician group’s risk considerably. 
In Case 4.3 the CIO touts the latest and greatest 
“flavors” of agile development. Unlike the 
CareGroup CIO, he has not experienced a dramatic 
crisis. Like a lobster in a pot, he might not recognize 
how hot the water is getting, until it’s too late. Both 
CIOs touted the benefits of IT innovations, and both 
CIOs failed to notice operational evidence of trouble 
brewing. Neither of these two CIOs recognized how 
and why procedures, processes, and controls help 
prevent trouble, even though textbooks indicate a 
CIO should oversee these.  
All three dangerous IT innovation champions in 
our recent studies fit in the upper left quadrant of 
Figure 1 (Charismatic Dangerous IT Innovation 
Champions). Gaps in their knowledge/ capability sets 
left their organizations vulnerable to high project 
risks (because the champions did not institute or 
require specific mechanisms for mitigating technical 
risks, organizational risks, interdependence risks, and 
other project risks). These executives are unlikely to 
notice signals that the IT innovation project team is 
making poor technical decisions, communicating 
poorly with other stakeholders, ignoring threats to 
information quality, and so on.  
The bottom half of the grid depicts two other 
scenarios. In the lower left quadrant, the hypothetical 
IT innovation champion at first articulates a 
persuasive vision (by definition) but subsequently 
fails to see the forest for the trees. This micro-
manager has trouble delegating operational work 
(and might not recognize their own knowledge/ 
capability gaps), and will likely alienate project team 
members, who need inspiration to continue when 
they encounter occasional technical challenges. An 
effective leader relies on a well-designed executive 
dashboard to monitor key metrics, and otherwise 
focuses on supporting the development team.  
In the bottom right quadrant is a leader who 
effectively attends to relevant operational details 
(because they have the IT knowledge/capability set to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant details). 
This IT Innovation Champion initially articulated a 
persuasive vision for the innovation (by definition), 
yet over time their attention increasingly focused on 
the details. Their strong IT knowledge makes them 
better suited to the role of reliable supervisor, who is 
likely to spot problems early and help fix them. This 
person will likely insist on a disciplined/ systematic 
approach to ensuring system reliability.  
In the upper right quadrant is the ideal Effective 
IT Innovation Champion. Some of these champions 
combine the strong vision with strong IT knowledge 
and capabilities. Others recognize the gaps in their IT 
knowledge and capabilities, and know when to rely 
on people who have the requisite knowledge.  When 
this champion is supported by a Reliable Supervisor 
(lower right quadrant), their capabilities are 
complementary: the champion sees the big picture, 
inspires the team, and marshals necessary resources, 
while the Reliable Supervisor attends to necessary 
details, spots problems, and helps fix them before 
they become bigger problems. 
Based on these findings, we offer five 
propositions about IT innovation champions: 
Proposition 1: As an IT innovation champion, an 
effective and mindful CIO attends to a long-term, 
strategic vision of value-from-IT-innovation, and 
monitors and provides useful resources and other 
forms of support to IT innovation projects.  
Proposition 2: A second-in-command Reliable 
Supervisor can complement the CIO’s long-term 
vision by closely attending to ongoing operational 
risks and closely monitoring the innovation project. 
Proposition 3: In order to develop the knowledge 
to work effectively with a second-in-command, it is 
helpful if the CIO previously worked in the Reliable 
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Supervisor role, before transitioning to IT innovation 
champion and leader.  
Proposition 4: As an IT innovation champion, an 
effective and mindful CEO recognizes his/her IT-
related knowledge and capability gaps, and verifies 
that the CIO (or office of the CIO) demonstrate 
strong knowledge and capabilities related to both IT 
innovation and operational reliability. 
Proposition 5: To support IT innovation, a 
mindful Board of Directors recognizes the dual 
requirements (and challenges) of articulating a 
contextually-relevant strategic IT innovation value 
proposition and ensuring consistently reliable IT-
enabled operations. 
Our arguments and case study findings begin to 
answer calls for studies of dangerous champions 
(high-level champions such as those discussed in this 
paper, as well as IT innovation champions who 
emerge from the middle ranks of the organizational 
hierarchy).  We hope others will join us in 
conducting further in-depth qualitative and 
quantitative studies to test, refine, and debate our 
propositions about how and why dangerous IT 
innovation champions expose their organizations to 
high risks, and how the Board of Directors and other 
leaders can spot dangerous champions sufficiently 
early to take steps to mitigate project risks and 
operational risks that can bring financial and 
reputational harm to the organization. 
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